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author to protect the tentative character of these papers.

SOME NOTES ON SOVIE'-~ ECONOMJ:C DEBATE IN
-•-----•-•-·-~L----------

THE 1920 's

Marxian and non-Marxian poli.tical econom5.s':s ·were for many
years divided by a species of intellectual ':ron Curtain'.

Rela

tively few in either camp were sufficierltly curious~ or able to con
struct watchtowers to ascer~a:!.n what w2s happening on the other side.
In recent years, however, some ::airly major breaches have been made.
Indeed, in some important spheres of enquiry the p~oblem of communication has been reduced largely to one of terminology.

1

In some

cases this has occurred where the nature of a given problem was de
fined in similar fashionj the subsequent deployment of the processes
of purely logical thought determi_!ling a measure of congruity in its
further analysis.

2

Insofar as concerned non-Marxian economics, its major precon
dition was a shift in emphas5.s from static to dynamic analysis, this
in turn being powerfully st:i.mulated by the post World War II interest
in the growth problems of 'lessveloped economies.

1

,

'under-',

'semi-' or 'mis-' de

For development economists in general, and for

students of growth problems in th~ less-developed socialist economies
in particular, especial inte:r.~st a-':t.1-:h0'3 to the work of Soviet
economists in tl:,ie 1920 's.

lfwx h,:.Hl d,:70-:ed the grea::er part of his

energies to an exam:_:_nat.ton o: the

oncr:md5.
~-m,;· _,__,"tus
.,. .,. . ~--•---.sa,o

of capitalist economy,

the distinctive economic p:roduc':: c,-£ F;.1ich "t-Jas, historically, the
.... ~ 3
rapid accumulation of capi,.a.:..

no•JJ8··,•er, he had declined to predict
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the modus operandi of socialist economy

l+

- the distinctive economic

product of ·which was to be the accelerated accumulation of capital ..
and the discussion of Soviet economists in the 1920 's was devoted
precisely to its mode of development in circumstances of weakly
developed industry and dominant peasant agriculture.

5

With the

passage of time there has been an increasingly catholic appreciation
of the intellectually distinguished character of this discussion and
a more general, albeit still insufficient, recognition of the major
contributions made therein both to the theory and practice of economic
development.

6

In retrospect, it can be seen that economic debate as such turned
largely on one complex issue: the rate and type of short-medium term
economic development that it was possible to plan given the marketed
surplus of peasant agriculture to constitute the major source of in
vestment funds.
This debate was in turn to be dominated by more or less well
defined political constraints.

On the crucial question of the mode

o~ and limits to, extraction of the agricultural surplus - in
Bukharin's words, of:

11

how much can we take away from the peasantry.

to what extent and by what methods can ,·1e accomplish the pumping
over process, ,·1hat are the limits of the pumping over? 117 - the most

powerful political constraints were those implicit in Lenin's con•
ception of the 'Harker-Peasant Alliance'.
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Given the

li□ited

level of industrialisati on - and, therefore,

given the limited size of the proletariat - he had enunciated this
conception repeatedly as a precondition for the very survival of the
Soviet regime.

The essential product, over the period 1923-28, of

its official acceptance was the eschewal in Government practice of
courses of political and economic action likely too radically to upset it,

8

There have been frequent - and sometimes obscurantist - attempts
to compartmentalis e the major contributions to Soviet economic dis
cussion in the 1920 1 s into well-defined political camps.

Such efforts

have been further complicated by attempts to link particular economists
with major political personalities of the period - for example with
Stalin or Trotsky. 9

In practice, however, the political tendencies

imputed to contributors to the economic discussion at the time seem
largely to have been derived from estimates (often made by Stalin)
as to whether their views implied too gross an imbalance - political
and/or economic - within the 'Worker-Peasant Alliance'. lO

It is

taken as axiomatic, of course, that the political implications of
conflicts of development strategy and related conflicts as to the
nature and scope of economic planning were of crucial importance for
comprehending the Soviet growth strategy eventually to be planned in
practice. For present purposes, however, emphasis will be placed on
some conflicts that were centred fairly explicitly on chains of econ
omic reasoning.
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Conflicts of Economic Strategy: Shanin versus Preobrazhensky

It will be illuminating to compare and contrast just two of
the many contributions to the strategy of economic growth discussed
in the 1920's.

Both advocated what might today be termed strategies

of 'unbalanced' growth, and they shared certain basic assumptions.
Lev Shanin advanced the proposition that in the initial period of
investment-plannin8, the prime objective should be to secure a rate
of growth of agricultural output greater than that of industry.
Evgeny Preobrazhensky, in contrast, advocated an initial concentra
tion on industrial growth, with a particular emphasis on growth in
t h e pro ducer-goo ds sector.

11

Shanin in the first place identified the fundamental cause of
the then-existing 'commodity-shortage' (later to be more popularly
known as 'goods-famine') to have been the past concentration of in
vestment within industry itself in the production of producer - rather
than consumer-goods.

He argued that an 'unbalanced' industrial in

vestment pattern of this type had led to the inability of industry
to satisfy adequately either peasant demand, or the consumer-goods
demand generated by the development of industry itself.

Accordingly,

he proposed a re-allocation of industrial investment-funds so as to
achieve a more 'balanced' development of heavy and light industry.
From the longer-term point of view, Shanin i-1as to note that:

12
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"Our industry's growth in the period itnl.!lediately ahead will have
two sources: (1) its aim accumulation and (2) the diversion of
resources from other spheres of the economy (from agriculture). "
Industrial accumulation financed by (1) he termed "Intra-industri al
accumulation"; and that by (2) was termed
accumulation 11 •

11

ulterior intra-industria l

13

Shanin agreed with Preobrazhensky 's proposition that the limited
level of industrialisati on determined that the major source of in
vestment funds was

11

ulterior 11

-

i.e. priraarily agricultural - in origin.

He opposed, however, the -::-elative concentration of such funds in in
dustrial growth, recommending their relative diversion to agriculture
itself.

14

Making the common emphasis on the need for

11

painless II and

11

crisis

free11 development, Shanin argued that nin our circumstances, investment
of capital in agriculture is more profitable than investment in
industry": the quantity of fixed capital required to set in motion a
given quantity of labour being lower, and the level of consumption of
that labour also being lower,
In Shan in' s view, the

11

in agriculture than in industry.

15

biggest asset il of the economy was "the

possibility of achieving a (national) upsurge•.• through agricultural
exports.

11

16

l!To the extent that the world r,1arket for agricultural

products in their original form becomes eJ{hausted, a world market
must be opened up by way of the industrial processing of agricultural

- 6 -

raw materials.

After srain and animal husbandry have had their turn,

sugar, alcohol, textiles, leather products, etc. must have theirs.
To the extent that these possibilities, too, exhaust themselves,
development must proceed thanks mainly to the industry which, though
operating for the domestic market, uses agricultural raw materials or
just agricultural foodstuffs.

But at the same time we should also

develop those industries which, though they do not operate on
agricultural raw materials, are nevertheless highly important in the
export field (petroleuQ, manganese, platinum, etc., and the rubber,
match and lumber industries).

11

Allowing exceptions for industries

with longer-term prospects for achieving economies of scale, and for
defence-interes ts, the criteria for industrial investment of other
kinds was whether or not the prices for domestic output would be com
petitive with the export prices of the capitalist economies for the
same products. 17
"It is clear that by cutting the relative share of the surplus
product of agriculture to be diverted at this time from agriculture
to industry, in the early years we also reduce the absolute magnitude

of what we pour into industry.

But later, thanks to the considerably

greater fruitfulness of investment in agriculture, the reduction of
the relative share of the transfusions can yield in absolute figures a
greater mass for injection into industry.

n

Hith this pattern of

development, the ndisproportion between industry and agriculture will
be more noticeable;, than ,;•Jith the existing relative concentration on
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industrial investment:

11

the relative growth of industry..• will be

smaller••• because•.. agriculture will develop faster still... What v1e
lose in the rate of industrial development in the initial years will
be made up with interest in the succeeding ones. "

18

Preobrazhensky attacked this concept of development with great
vigour.

In The Nei;J Economics he had stressed "the prodigiously im

portant role"

due to be played ' 1in a backward peasant economy... (by)

the accumulation of material resources in the hands of the state"
from "sources lying outside the complex of the state economy.

11

He

defined this as 'primary socialist accumulation' and had argued that
"the period of primary socialist accumulation is the most critical
period in the life of the socialist state.

In this period the social

ist system is not yet in a position to develop all its organically in
herent advantages, but atthe same time it is bound to nullify a number
of the economic advantages inherent in a well-developed capitalist
system.

It is a matter of life and death for the socialist state to

traverse this period as quickly as possible 11 and where,
of their rising incomes,

11

in the context

it behoves the socialist state to take more,

t ook . "19
. 1 1.sm
·
no t 1ess, f rom t h e sma 11 -sea 1e pro d ucers t h an capita
Addressing himself,

in 1927, to "the foundations of dynamic

equilibrium of the economic system of the USSR",

20

he was to repeat

his argument that given the superior productive efficiency of developed
world capitalist industry vis

a vis

Soviet socialist industr/1,

aecon

omic equilibrium, which ensures expanded reproduction in the state
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sector can exist only on the basis of non-equiv alent exchange with
the private sectors. 22
ii

While attaching great political significan ce to rapid socialist
industria l growth, Preobrazh ensky was also to attack Shanin's <level•
opment strategy on purely economic grounds.
Applying Marx's distinctio n between the productio n of producer
and consumer- goods (Departme nts I and II) to the 'State',

'Capitali st'

and 'Small-Sc ale Producer' (or 'Simple Commodity Productio n') Sectors,
he was firstly to object to Shanin 's preoccupa tion with the level of
demand for (particul arly) industria l output.

He argued that

Departmen t II of the State sector would consume the increased output
of Departmen t I; and the rising level of industria l employment would
provide increasin g demand for the output of Departmen t II.
Secondly, he argued that an increase in agricultu ral productio n
especiall y of 'technica l' or 'industri al' crops - was most effective ly
to be secured via the expansion of the producer- goods sector of peasant
economy (i, e. of ploughs, seeds, fertiliser s, tractors, etc. ) :

11

0n

the

basis of increasin g accumula tion in that departmen t of the peasant
sect:or. it will be easier to achieve decisive successes with respect
to improving land cultivatio n, advancing animal husbandry , and in
creasing labour productiv ity in general, which will increase the aggregate annual output of industria l crops. "23 However, such an expansion was itself, to an important degree, dependent upon the
24
pr i or expansion
.
o f t l1e pro d ucer-goo d.s sector o f in
· d ustry.
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Shanin had drawn attention to the lengthy gestation period
of certain industrial investments.

Such investment yielded no

short-period output but employment therein generated a rising demand
for consumer-goods.

He had argued that 'commodity reserves' of con

sumer-goods should precede such large-scale investments (i.e. light
industry or substantial imports must precede the large-scale develop
ment of heavy industry).
Preobrazhensky stood this argument on its head.

He acknowledged

the problem of the 'period of production 125, but noted: "the process
of accumulation in our peasant agriculture proceeds discontinuously
in years of good harv£sts.

Hundreds of thousands of peasant farms

succeed in 'getting above water' in one year of good harvest, and
increase their means of production to an extent that they may not
be able to achieve again for perhaps another five years •.• However,
since there is no good harvest of machines, metals, etc., in heavy
industry, the demand for additional means of production which origin
ates in peasant agriculture will not be satisfied unless accumulation
in heavy industry runs systematically ahead of accumulation in the
other branches of the economy as a whole, in particular if it does
not ensure the existence of necessary commodity reserves. 1126
He also emphasised, however, that "peasant agriculture in the
USSR could, even •oith the existing means of production,

increase con

siderably the gross output through increased outlay of physical labour,
in particular by putting into effect a number of simple agronomical
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improvements.

11

He regarded nthe struggle against fear of work in the

village and traditional laziness" to be none of the most important
problems of industrialisation of the country,

11

27

and spoke of "the

absorption of both hidden and overt unemployment inherited by the
Soviet system, in the main, from the agrarian relationships of the
old regime. 1128
Thus, it was possible to contrast quite neatly two strategies
for economic growth with a common long-term product - a substantial
increase of the relative share of industry in national economic activ
ity - but with opposed short-to-medium term strategies whereby the
long-term end was to be achieved.

X

y

Rate
of
Growth

Time

Shanin, concentrating investment funds drawn primarily from
agriculture in, firstly, agricultural production itself and, via a
substantial foreign trade, in producer-goods only after a significant
light industry had been developed; and Preobrazhensky, concentrating
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the same investment- funds in, firstly, domestic producer-go ods in
dustries, with increased agricultura l and light industrial develop
ment following upon it.
In the Diagram, the (rough) growth-patt ern consequenti al upon
their respective investment -priorities would be Shanin 's, when 'X'
equals agricultura l production and 'Y' industrial output, and
Preobrazhen sky's with reversed definitions . 29
Shanin had acknowledge d the "purely economic" character of his
development strategy and had noted it to be presented "in isolation
from the political aspects associated with the fact that we are
. n in
. capita
. 1ist
·
. 1ement. 1130
carry i ng on our constructio
encirc

Preobrazhen sky, on the other hand, had concluded his analysis
by noting the "aggregate of economic and social contradictio ns nec
essarily bared by our development towards socialism under the con
ditions of our isolation, "

They included:

"Accumulati on at the expense of the surplus product of the workers and the necessity of a systet!latic growth of wages. "
"The necessity (in order to diminish the 'birth pains of indus
trialisatio n') for the utmost increase in association with the world
division of labour" - i, e. foreign trade - "and the growing hostility
toward the USSR of the entire capitalist world."
"Accumulati on at the expense of the peasants producing industrial
raw materials, and of the peasants in general - and the necessity of
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utmost stimulation of expanded reproduction of these raw materials.

11

"The economic necessity of increasing marketable surpluses in
peasant agriculture - and the social necessity of physical maintenance
of those who provide the smallest marketable surplus, namely, the
poor and middle-sized groups in the village.

11

All such contradictions showed, in his view, that: "not only for
political but also for economic reasons, we must be aided in future
by the material resources of other socialist countries. 1131
'Geneticists' and 'Teleologists' in Soviet Planning Theory:
One product of the penchant for constructing mutually-exclusive
categories of economic thought was the distinction commonly made be
tween 'geneticist' and 'teleological' planners in the Soviet economy
of the 1920's.

32

The 'geneticists' were held to have placed emphasis on the con
straints imposed upon planned economic development by the mode of pro
duction at the moment of plan-implementation.

The 'teleologists', on

the other hand, are held to have stressed the freedom conferred upon
the planner by the very process of planned development itself.

The

discussion on the respective roles of prediction and pre-determination
in planning has often been mis-interpreted.

33

One reason for this is

that there was in reality no very coherent body of non-intuitive
logical constructs to oppose the major 'geneticist' argument as to the
area and degree in and to which the planner qua planner must operate
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within limits that he himself could not determine. 34

The 'genetic'

versus 'teleological' discussion contained within it, of course, the
seeds of the ancient and infinitely wide debate as to the circumstances
in which human will could or could not conquer 'objective 1 obstacles. 35
For present purposes, however, it will be helpful to fasten upon a
'genetic' constraint upon the freedom of the planner to plan that was
strongly emphasised in the course of Soviet discussion.

Planning and the Peasant:
The identification of the marketed surplus of peasant agriculture
as the major constraint upon the short-tero rate of economic growth
(and, thereby, for economists such as Shanin, Sokolnikov and Bukharin,
as the logical determinant of the type of agro-industrial growth to be
planned) simultaneously pointed to the crucial constraint upon the
exercise of 'teleological' powers by the planner.
Bazarov was to argue that: "The basic task of perspective planning•..
entails the need to combine the genetic and teleological methods in
the search for the optimum course of development."

In his view "the

state sector of the economy is a sphere of teleological constructs
primarily" in which genetic enquiry yielded

11

only a quantitative in

ventory of the resources which can be utilised.

ii

However, "agriculture,

parcelled into nore than 20 million small independent units ... is the
sphere in which genetic enquiry plays the predominant role. 1136
In more forceful terms, he referred to the "unapproachable fortress
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in which, despite all the countercurrents in our planned economy,
hides the peasant, like a snail in his shell, easily and simply es
caping beyond all attempts of planning to reach him. 1137
The implications of this were very clear.

Given the social re

lations of agricultural production prevailing, planned socialist in
dustrial growth could not but be fundamentally prognostic in character.
The very basis of the socialist industrial plan - the quantity of
food for labour, the quantity of certain major raw materials for
essential consumer-goods, the wherewithal to obtain foreign capital was not to be determined fundamentally by the decision-making of
planners: it rested, rather, on the annual material product of mar
keting decisions taken by millions of individual peasant households
traditionally skilled in the evasion of taxes and the burial of grain.
The planners, fixed though their eyes might be upon socialist indus
trial construction, must wait upon peasants whose eyes had traditionally
been fixed upon the weather, their stomachs, and the general main chance.
The planner might determine, within limits, the allocation of resources
derived from agricultural activity, but he must predict their volume.
In brief, "Mr. Harvest, Comrade Harvest, Citizen Harvest - he is the
master of the country.

11

3G

And the peasant (principally the 'middle' and

'rich' one) was, subject to benevolent or malevolent climatic circum
stances, the master of the harvest.
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The Road to Collectivisation: Stalin

11

0n the Grain Front 11 :

The preponderance of agriculture in the national economy had
in turn tended to dominate both the discussion of strategies of
economic development and of the role of 'genetic' and 'teleological'
elements in planning.
However, as had been noted with the publication of the Control
Figures for 1926/27: "The most important question of our future - the
character of social stratification in the village and its tempo - can
not be illuminated in our work for lack of data. 1139

In such circum

stances, it was possible to detect a common (and usually implicit)
assumption that had tended to underpin the general politico-economic
context within which the debate had hitherto largely been conducted.
The assumption in question had been that insofar as concerned the
generation of a surplus-product, the mode of agricultural production
had, with respect to that of the pre-1914 period, not been fundamentally
changed by the Soviet regime itself.

Such an assumption, for example,

underlay the assertion of 'geneticists' such as Groman to the effect
that "pre-war relations in which the conditions of economic equilibrium
were expressed, provide to a large extent regulative standards, in the
objective sense, for present-day economic movements. 1140

"Even.•• the

greatest of all revolutions - the October revolution - cannot change
economic forms over night. 1141
This assumption was to be overthrown by Stalin in a speech en-
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titled

0n the Grain Front ll delivered to the Communist Academy and

11

the Sverdlov University on 28th May, 1920.

42

The fundamental question to which Stalin addressed himself (in
what must be regarded as the crucial politico-econom ic document of
the period) was: "why the increase in the production of grain for
the market in our country is ... in spite of the fact that our crop
area and the gross production of grain have already reached the pre
war level. .• only one-half, and the amount we are exporting.•. only
about one-twentieth, of what it was in pre-war times?

1143

The vital statistical basis of Stalin's subsequent analysis was
in his view "quite adequate to enable us to understand the difference
between the pre-war period and the post-October (1917) period in re
gard to the structure of grain production in general, and of the pro
duction of market grain in particular,
not claim to be exact.

11

lf4

11

though the calculations

11

do

In fact there is abundant evidence to in-

dicate that the data (given in Table 1) ·was highly inexact but not in
45
such a fashion as to refute the burden of Stalin's argument.
11
Stalin noted that while "at the first glance it might appear

that the grain problem was "the result merely of faulty planning, the
result merely of a number of mistakes committed in the sphere of
economic coordination•• ,it would be an... error to exaggerate the part
played by the planning principle in the belief that we have already
reached a stage of development when it is possible to plan and regulate

- 17 -

TABLE 1

The Structure of Grain Production in Pre-Har Russian, and
Post-hevolutionary (1926-27) Soviet
Agriculture(+)

Marketed Grain (i.e.
not consumed in the
Rural districts)

Gross Grain
Production
Period
Millions
of Poods

%

I

% of
Market Grain

Millions
of Foods

%

281.6

21. 6

47.0

650.0

50. 0

34. 0

369. 0

28.4

lii-. 7

Pre-War

1.

Landlords •.••

600

12.0

2.

Kulaks •..•••.

1900

38. O

3.

Middle & Poor
Peasants ...•.

2500

50. 0
--

TOTAL, •.•.

'

I

5000

100.0

1300. 6

100.0

26.0

State & Collective Farms.

80

1.7

37.8

6.0

47. 2

2.

Kulaks .......•

617

13. 0

126.0

20. 0

20.0

3.

Middle & Poor
Peasants ••....

4052

85.3

466.2

74.0

11.2

TOTAL•.•.••

47l~9

100.0

630.0

100.0

13.3

1926-27
1.

I

(+)Estimates of v. S. Nemchinov of the Collegiur:.1 of the Central Statistical
Board, published in Leninism, op. cit., p. 208.
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everything.

11

In addition nto elements in our national economy which

lend themselves to planning there are elements in our national economy
1146
which do not as yet lend themselves to planning.

In the years immediately prior to 1925-26, the fact that both the
volume and share in total production of the agricultural surplus mar
keted by the peasantry as a whole should have fallen substantially
below pre-war levels had been explicable largely by reference to the
fact that total agricultural production was itself substantially be
low that of 1913.

Scarcities of industrial commodities and/or their

higher prices relative to those of agricultural produce could be, and
were, adduced as important exacerbating factors.

A growing preoccupa

tion with planning 'errors' was to accompany the re-expansion of the
cultivated area, assisted in some regions by improvement in crop-ro
7
tation methods Li- , which had, by 1925-26, restored total agricultural

production to pre-war levels, with grain-harvests being consecutively
good for the years 1925-27.

48

For Stalin, however, the prime cause of the grain difficulties
was "the change in the structure of our agriculture brought about by
the October Revolution, the change from large-scale landlord and large
scale kulak farming, ,·1hich provided the largest proportion of marketed
grain, to small and raiddle peasant farming, which provides the smallest
proportion of marketed grain..• the production of the overwhelming pro
portion of grain products has passed from the hands of landlords and
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kulaks into the hands of small and middle peasants.

This means that

the small and middle peasants, having completely emancipated themselves
from the yoke of the l~ndlords, and having, in the main, broken the
strength of the kulaks, have thereby obtained the opportunity of con
siderably improving their material conditions

49

..• ,The USSR has be

come, as a result of the October Revolution, a land of small peasant
farming, and the middle peasant has become the 'central figure' in
agriculture •.• the abolition of landlord (large-scale) farming, the
reduction of kulak (large-scale) farming to less than one-third, and
the change to small peasant farmin~ with only 11 per cent of its out
put available for the oarket, under conditions of the absence in the
sphere of grain grouin3 of any more or less developed large-scale farm
ing in common (collective farms anc state farms), was bound to lead,
and in fact has led, to a sharp reduction in the output of grain for
the market as compared uith pre-war times, .• That is the underlying
cause of our difficulties on the grain front. ,,SO
This statement of the radical post-revolutionary change in,
fundamentally, the social relations of agricultural production brought
about by the (largely spontaneous) Agrarian Reform of 1917 - namely of
the reduction of large-scale farming for the urban and export markets
and of the increase in small-scale farming for subsistence and rural
markets - indicated the crucial limitations of the range of "market •1 so
lutions to the surplus-extraction problem that had hitherto been the
subject of both discussion and experiment,

Post-revolutionary problems
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of trade bet·ween town and countryside might have contributed to the
decline in the share of small-scale farm output placed on extra-rural
markets reported (by no means reliably) to have occurred by 1926-27
in comparison with that prior to 1914.

More plausibly, such problems

contributed to the sharper fall reported to have occurred f o r ~
farms.

The latter continued to attract most of the attention of

'Rightists' and 'Leftists

I

but they were not only, as Stalin had noted,

reduced to about one-third of their previous number: those still in
existence were of smaller average si:ze.

51

The fundamental problem, how

ever, was that the restoration of the shares of output placed on extra
rural markets to pre-revolutionary proportions per farm-size group
would not restore the total surplus to anything approaching that mar
keted prior to 1914.

Agriculture was now dominated by small-scale

peasant farmers ,·1ho had traditionally consumed perhaps 85% or more of
their production and who now produced more than 80% of the nation's
grain,
In this context one could properly censure both 'Rightists' and
some 'Leftists' for

11

over-reliance on the price-mechanism and fiscal

measures in a country which was engaged in a tremendous bid for indus
trialisation; too much emphasis on the potentialities of the private
sector in agriculture and not enough on the urgent need for fostering
new organisational forms. 1152

In addition, while the 'geneticists' were

undubitably right to stress the manner in 1-1hich the agricultural mode
of production determined the agricultural surplus to be available for
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industrial or other investment.s, they were quite wrong to imagine that
the mode of production prior t o ~ was still of decisive relevance.
Stalin's assessr..1ent of the manner in which the mode of agricultural
production of 1926-27 determined the volume of investment-funds to be
obtainable from agricultural activities at once contemporized the
'geneticist' case and effectively portrayed as insuperable the major
obstacles to rapid short-term industrial growth that "pessimists II had
stressed.

The growth-accelerating virtues of socialist economic plan

ning per se were generally deemed to permit an agricultural surplus
roughly comparable with that of the pre-191l~ period to finance a far
higher rate of industrial growth than had been attained in Tzarist
times.

The entire perspective for growth was changed, houever, if the

surplus in the hands of the planners was to be but one-half, or little
more than one-half, that of pre-Revolutionary times.

And - in the con

text of an urban population growth of about 5% per annum.53 - neither
trends in total agricultural production nor estimates as to rising
yields to be expected in the immediate future indicated any radical
•
l
•
.
SL:.
s h ort - t erm c h ange in
suc1 a situation.

The solution to the problem flowed logically from the analysis
that Stalin had deployed for its identification: while by 1926-27,
State and collective farms were estimated to produce less than 2% of
total grain production, their marketed surplus amounted to some 6%
of the total ·surplus in the hands of the State's grain-collection
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agencies.

The 47% of their output estimated to be placed on extra

rural markets was virtually identical with the marketings
of the estates prior to 1914. 55

Hence, for Stalin, "the way out... of

our difficultue s on the grain front •.. lies firstly, in the transition
from individual peasant farming to collective, to common farming..•
secondly, in expanding and strengthenin g the old state farms and in
organizing and developing new, large state farms ..• finally... in system
atically increasing the yields of the small and middle individualpeasant farms. 1156 He spoke of a period of nthree or four years 11 to
permit the state -

21

if all these tasks are fulfilled" - "a supply

(of marketed grain) more or less sufficient to enable us to manoeuvre
within the country as well as abroad. n 57
If there was no doubt in Stalin's mind as to the economic desirability in terms of surplus-ext raction of more or less rapid collectiv
isation58, the problem of any drastic acceleratio n of the process within
the politico-eco nomic parameters implicit to the official conception of
the 'Worker-Pea sant Alliance' was acute. 59 The estimate that the long
term political and military survival of the Soviet regime (together with
the progress towards 'higher forms' of socialism and communism) 6 0 de
pended on rapid industrial growth, based most particularl y on that of
heavy industry, was in the event to ensure that in some way (and at
virtually any cost) the political and economic constraints upon the ex
traction of the agricultura l surplus be smashed. 61
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The Collectivizatio n Programme of 1929 and its Short-Term Product:
In 1928-29, there was an accelerated fall in the marketed sur
plus of grain, with collections falling by about one-third in com
parison with their level of 1926-27.

62

Notwithstanding , in the spring

of 1929, the Government adopted the optimal variant of the First Five
Year Plan proposed by GOSPLAN.

Under this variant, net investment

over the period 1928-33 uas to be of the order of one-quarter to onethird of annual national income, with three-quarters of all industrial
. d ustry.
· h eavy in
.
to b e 1 ocate8' in
investment

on which this variant ,·las based were:

11

63

The first two assumptions

(a) the absence of any even

moderately serious crop failu::e du:dng the five-years period; (b) a
considerably greater scope of economic ties with the world economy by
virtue of a considerably more rapid growth of long-term foreign credits
in the initial year of the Five-Year Plan.

;i

Both 'optimal' and lower (Starting') variants of the plan had
assumed a substantial increase of the collectivized sector in agriculture
"with the greatest possible forcing of this matter in view of its particular importance.

6L,.
n

·

The grain-supplies crisis of 1928-29 - some 250,000 tons of grain
were imported in 1929

65

- induced the adoption of emergency measures

reminiscent of the early period of 'War Communism' (requisitions,
searches for buried grain, etc.) which preceded and probably hastened
66
Such
the massive drive for collectivizatio n unleashed in late 1929.
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measures were, indeed, to constitute the immediate precedents for the
·
·
coecion
emp 1oyment o f massive

67

1 a d1 ·t.ica,
on t h e part o f t he poi

reinistrative and military instruments of the Soviet State.

Ostensibly

directed in a nfrontal attack" against the kulak farms, such coercion
68
·
· 1 sections
o f t he mi" ddle-peasantry.
was a 1so to emb race substantia
A large proportion of the poor peasantry showed a signal lack of en

thusiasm for the speed and manner with which collectivization was
carried out.

69

By the end of 1932 - and associated, from mid-1930, with the em70
.
.
.
' an d 1ess coercive
- some 60"'k o f
incentives
p 1oyment o f more economic

the peasantry were organised in collective farms.

Given the limited

quantity of State investment in agriculture for the period, and its
division between the collective and rapidly expanding State farm sector,

71

the quantity of tractors available for collective farms did

not offset, over the period 1929-32, the sharply-reduced sowing capacity on such farms induced by the massive slaughter of ploughing an72
·
· ·
. d .c~orce d co 11ectivisation.
. 1s th a t' accornpanie
irna

The relative concen-

tration of State investment in agriculture in the labour-saving forms
of tractors and combine-harvesters in State farms yielded an eitht
fold increase in their sm-m area as compared with 1928, but their
marketed surplus was increased but four-fold.

73

For the period 1929-

32 as a whole, there is abundant evidence to suggest that the average
value of total agricultural production in collectivised farm-areas fell
substantially below that of 1926-28, with local consumption falling yet
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more sharply.

74

Nevertheless, the primary short-term objectives of the col
lectivization programme - which has been described as "probably the
most significant, and certainly the most revolutionary, decision taken
1175 - can f airy
.
i n th e f.i rs t fif ty years o f i ts existence
·
· l
b y the regl.l!le

be said to have been achieved.

By the end of 1932, State and col

lective farms combined produced over 80% of the national marketed
surplus of grain and cotton.

76

Since the fundamental change of a

short-term character in the mode of production brought about by
collectivisation was that in the social relations of production facil•
itating collection, the planner rather than the peasant was enabled to
determine within broad limits the shares of the bulk of total output
to be devoted, respectively, to rural consumption and to urban, in
dustrial and export markets.

The absolute volume of the na~ional

marketed surplus by 1932-33 was estimated to be almost double that of
1926-27 in the case of grain and potatoes, and more than double for
cotton, flax and wool.

(Largely as a consequence of the livestock

slaughter, meat surpluses were estimated to have fallen by more than
.
he same perio.
. d )77
40 per cent int

And Stalin was thus to secure

rather more than double the increase in grain supplies that he had
envisaged to be necessary in 1928.

78

This is as far as the story of Soviet economic discussion in the
1920 's is here taken, and as far as we follow the terrible choices
with which it concluded.

The major decisions taken towards the end

of the debate - for heavy industry and collectivization - closed the
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debate itself, and ushered in a period of dogmatism in Soviet social
science that reduced political economy in particularly to the "rather
arid repetition of accepted doctrines. 11 79

The intellectual casual-

ties of the period were to include precisely those economists who had

provided - intentionally or no - major justifications for the path of
development actually selected.

80

It has often been held in some

Marxian circles that such 'excesses' were the product of the immense
political and economic difficulties of the period, compounded by the
military threat implicit in 'hostile capitalist encirclement. '

The

hole in this argument is the fact that such difficulties were at
least as extreme in the 1920's and to an important degree provided
the political preconditions for the high calibre of the debate it

self.

Perhaps the best example of this is provided by the Preface to

the Second Edition (1926) of Preobrazhensky's The New Economics.

The

Editorial Board of the Communist Academy Publishing House there ob
served that: "this work puts forward views which the editorial board
does not share and which are being used as the theoretical foundation
for their position by groups of comrades who are at variance with our

party,

However, the problems of the ecconomy of the transition period,

which are attracting very intense attention in both their practical

and their theoretical aspects. call for an all-round analysis. 1181

This

was not a spirit which long survived.
This account does not purport to proffer any full or original
analysis of the political, economic and theoretical complexities

of
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the period.

Disagreements with, or qualifications to, the arguments

of historians upon whose accounts this writer has drawn heavily for
quotations, commentary and empirical evidence have not for the most
part been made explicit though they are in many instances substantial.
Above all, it has been beyond the purpose of this essay to speculate
as to the manner in which Soviet affairs might have evolved had
things which were done not been done or been done in different manner.
(Such speculation does not usually facilitate comprehension of an
already sufficiently complex historical episode.)
What has been attempted is a survey of certain salient features
of the period which will be intelligible to both Marxists and non
Marxists - a risky exercise since one thus commonly satisfies neither
and, further, risks triggering two sets of conditioned reflexes rather
than one.

(See note 1).

The awkward device of extensive footnotes

has been adopted partly to avoid cluttering the text with unnecessary
detail; partly to provide bibliographic references for those who would
explore the matter more fully; and partly (and doubtless vainly) to
avoid too grossly offending the specialists of the period whose sub
jects they might feel to have been treated in a fashion that is ex
cessively simpliste if not tendentious.

FOOTNOTES
----1It remains true, of course) that purely terminological
differences, for both Marxian and non-Narxian academics, often
generate communication problems quite disproportionate to their
nature. Usually originating in very real conflicts of political
philosophy .. some assumptions of which are commonly embodied in
both 'scientific political economy' and !value-free economics' a powerful set of conditioned reflexes was developed. Partial
paralysis of the analytical powers of the brain of masters of
both 'dialectical' and other methodologies could and can often
be triggered by perception of certain t:erms or names.
2
Perhaps the most famous example is examined by Prof. J. V,
Robinson in her essay on 'Kalecki and ~Ceynes' in Collected Economic
Papers, Vol. III, Blackwell, Oxford, 1965. (Reprinted from Essays
in Honour of r1ichael Kalecki, :1,964). She was concerned to ex
plore the conditions --:i..'n which "two thinkers, from completely dif
ferent political and intellectual starting points, should come
to the same conclusion. 11 It emerges that in Cambridge, in 1931,
no member of Keynes' famous 'circus' had ever read Marx. Richard
Kahn, for example, made a seminal contribution to Keynesian theory
at that time by imagin:Lng a cordon round the capital-goods in
dustries and then studying the trade between them and the con
sumption-good industries. This; of course, was to re-invent Marx's
Departments I and II of which the members of the 'circus' were
quite unaware. (See pp. 95-6).
Mrs. Robinson also notes on affinity between the HarrodDomar growth model and that of Rosa Luxumburg. {See her intro
duction to The Accumulation of Capital by Rosa Luxumburg, Routledge
and Kegan, Paul, London, 1951). fu fact, a closer relationship with
this model is to be observed in the work of G.A. Feldman of 1928-29.
(See M.H. Dobb's Soviet Economic Development since 1917, Sixth
Edition, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966, pp. 360-61. Also
see the same writer's 'The Discussions of the 1920's about Building
Socialism' in Estratto da Annali dell 'Istituto Giangiacomo
Feltrinelli, 1967, pp. 165-6). A~lysis of analogies between
Marx's reproduction models and contemporary growth-models is given
in M. Kalecki's 'The Marxian Equations of Reproduction and Modern
Economics', Social Scienc~ Information_, VII-6, International Social
Science Council, Paris, Dec. 1968~ pp. 73-9.
3

1n M.:irx's schema, the key co comprehending capitalist economy
lay in the deployment of the ,:oncepts of the 'forces of production'
on the one hand, and of the 'social relations of production' on the
other. The capitalist 'mode of production 1 was itself to be seen
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Footnote 3 continued: in essence as the dynamic product of the
interaction of the 'forces' and 'social relations' of production.
In non-Marxian parlance, the 'forces of production' correspond,
broadly speaking, to the 'techniques' of production. If the
'level of development' of the productive forces were described as
'weak' or 'low', this could be taken broadly to mean, for a
specific sector in a given moment of time, a low capital-intensity
in the technique of production. Marx's 'social relations of pro
duction', on the other hand, embrace the social and institutional
circumstances within which the factors of production are applied
to the processes of production. In the case of agriculture, for
example, the system/s of land-tenure can be regarded to comprise
the gist of Marx's 'social relations' of production.
4

His most explicit views on the subject are expressed in his
Critique of the Gotha Programme.
5
This, of course, was to be of morJentous consequence for
'socialist society' as it emerged in practice. Marx in general
envisaged socialist revolution as coming in developed capitalist
countries (such as Germany) rather than in those with weakly
developed productive forces. In the former circumstances, Marxian
socialists would be free to devote their energies to such matters
as the socially rational use of inherited developed resources,
the more equitable distribution of income, the 'reduction of
alienation', and so on and so forth. As it turned out, the over
riding priority for Soviet revolutionaries after 1917 was the
accelerated development of the productive forces to the level they
should, in theory, have had at the time of the Bolshevik revolution.
6
The attention of many non-Marxian economists was drawn to
this discussion by Alexander Erlich, who described it as "a sing
ularly exciting chapter in the history of economic doctrines; a
chapter which is particularly worth exploring at a time when long
range growth has come a8ain, after the lapse of nearly a century,
to be one of the key concerns of economics, and when the presence
of political elements in large economic decisions no longer causes
apprehension." (See The Soviet Industrialisation Debate, 1924-28,
Harvard, 1960, p. xix.) In addition, a more or less recent lower
ing of purely linguistic barriers has facilitated some first-hand
appreciation of the pioneering character of the work of economists
such as Popov, Litoshenko and Barenholz (in national income account
ing and input-output analysis); and of Feldman, Bazarov and Preo
brazhensky (theories of planning and growth). Notable instances
of this have been provided by N. Spulber's edition of Soviet econ
omic essays for the period 1924-3~ translated in Foundations of

- 29 -

Footnote 3 continued: in essence as the dynamic product of the
interaction of the 'forces' and 1social relations' of production.
In non-Marxian parlance, the 'forces of production' correspond,
broadly speaking, to the 'techniques' of production. If the
'level of development' of the productive forces were described as
'weak' or 'low', this could be taken broadly to mean, for a
specific sector in a given moment of time, a low capital-intensity
in the technique of production. Marx's 'social relations of pro
duction', on the other hand, embrace the social and institutional
circumstances within which the factors of production are applied
to the processes of production. In the case of agriculture, for
example, the system/s of land-tenure can be regarded to comprise
the gist of Marx's 'social relations' of production.
4

His most explicit views on the subject are expressed in his
Critique of the Gotha Programme.
5

This, of course, was to be of mor.1.entous consequence for
'socialist society' as it emerged in practice. Marx in general
envisaged socialist revolution as coming in developed capitalist
countries (such as Germany) rather than in those with weakly
developed productive forces. In the former circumstances, Marxian
socialists would be free to devote their energies to such matters
as the socially rational use of inherited developed resources,
the more equitable distribution of income, the 'reduction of
alienation', and so on and so forth, As it turned out, the over
riding priority for Soviet revolutionaries after 1917 was the
accelerated development of the productive forces to the level they
should, in theory, have had at the time of the Bolshevik revolution.
6Th

·
.
.
e attention
o f many non-Marxian
economists
was d rawn to
this discussion by Alexander Erlich, who described it as "a sing
ularly exciting chapter in the history of economic doctrines; a
chapter which is particularly worth exploring at a time when long
range growth has come again, after the lapse of nearly a century,
to be one of the key concerns of economics, and when the presence
of political elements in large economic decisions no longer causes
apprehension. " (See The Soviet Industrialisation Debate, 1924-28,
Harvard, 1960, p. xix.) In addition, a more or less recent lower
ing of purely linguistic barriers has facilitated some first-hand
appreciation of the pioneering character of the work of economists
such as Popov, Litoshenko and Barenholz (in national income account
ing and input-output analysis); and of Feldman, Bazarov and Preo
brazhensky (theories of planning and growth), Notable instances
of this have been provided by N. Spulber's edition of Soviet econ
omic essays for the period 1924-30, translated in Foundations of
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Footnote 6 continued: Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth,
Indiana University P:cess, 1964; •with the publication of Preo
brazhensky's The New Economics by the Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1965; and with Thorner, Kerblay and Smith 1 s edition of The
Theory of Peasant Econom_x by A. v. Chayanov. (Homewood, tllinois,
1966).
Appreciation of this literature is by no means general, of
course. Lionel Robbins, for example, believes that planned econ
omic development - or nauthoritarian collectivist growth"~ has
taken place largely in the absence of a theory of planned economic
development. (See The Theory__£f_E5onomic Development in the History
of Economic Thought, 11acMillan, London, 196D, p. 119). This view
may follow from his removal of Marxian development theories from
the history of economic thought since it is :,a type of theory which
clearly involves psychological and sociological assumptions not
usually regarded as part and parcel of economics strictly so-called. 11
(Ibid, p. 2.) It is instructive to compare this view with Lord
Robbins 1 earlier dismissal of Marxian development theory as unworthy
of consideration on the grounds that it was purely "technical II in
character. (See The Nature and Significance of Economic Science,
MacMillan, London, 1932, p. 42.) On the other hand, for Evsey
Domar, the Marxists had "come closest to developing a substantial
theory of economic grouth. 11 (Essays in the Theory of Economic
Growth, o. u. P., New York, 19570 17).
7
speech to Party functionaries in Leningrad, July 1926, quoted
in Dobb, 'The Discussions of the 1920 's about Building Socialism, '
op. cit., P• ll~9.
()

0

The peasantry deemed to be 'allies' of the urban proletariat
were the batraks and the 'poor' and 'middle' peasants.
'Poor'
peasants and batraks were commonly identical: the 'poor' peasant
was one having insufficient land or means of production to provide
himself with year-round subsistence and he was thus compelled to
hire out his labour; and the batrak was a hired agricultural
worker - in most cases employed seasonally - who commonly also
possessed a smell land~plot. The 1 middle' peasant neither sold
his own labour nor (unlike the 1 rich I peasant) hired that of others.
The position of the 'middle' peasant in the 'alliance' had
long been recognised as an uneasy one. In Lenin's vieu it was
"understood that the middle peasant cannot imraediately accept
socialism, because he firmly clings to what he is accustomed to,
regards all innovations warily, first tests that to which he
is invited in action, in practice, and does not make up his mind
to change his mode of life until he is convinced that the change is
necessary. 11 (Speech of 1919, in Selected Horks, Vol. 8, p. 188,
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Footnote 8 continued: Lawrence and Wishart, London.) For
Bukharin and Preobra:.::hensky, writing a little earlier, in fact
the "petty-proprietor mentality of the middle peasants ... inclines
them to form an alliance with the rich peasants, 11
not least because the rich peasant uas "a successful farmer 11 and further be
cause they disposed of agricultural surpluses in exchange for
which the urban proletariat was unable to supply an adequate
volume of industrial products. (See The ABC of Communism, Pen
guin Books, London 1969; pp. 371-2 and p. 374.)
9
such classifications commonly triggered the conditioned
reflexes previously mentioned.
lOThose (like Preobrazhensky) who advocated that the sum of
values to be given to the peasantry be substantially smaller than
those to be taken from them tended to be classified as 'Leftists.'
Those (like Bukharin) who were to advocate that they (especially
kulaks) be permitted to retain too high a proportion of the sum
of values they produced became 'Rightists. ' The 'correct' pos
ition, of course, ~-Jas 'Leninist' and came increasingly to be
associated with that of Stalin himself. From 1926/27 such a pos
ition tended to be that of advocating a high short-term rate of
growth of heavy industry with a continued public (if diminishing
private) lip-service to the 'Worker-Peasant Alliance. '
11

shanin 's views are given in Spulber (op. cit.) as 'The
Economic Nature of Our Commodity Shortage, ' pp. 205-211 (originally
in Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie, Nov. 1925, pp. 25-39); and as 'Ques
tions of the Economic Course', pp. 212-220 (originally in Bolshevik
No. 2, 30th January, 1926, pp. 65-87). Spulbe~ in his Introductory
Note on the subject, portrays Shanin to be an advocate (with Bazarov
and Bukharin) of 'simultaneous' growth of industry and agriculture.
In fact all Soviet economists argued for 'simultaneous' growth and
it is more sensible to distinguish between advocates of 'balanced'
industrial and agricultural growth, and those arguing for 'unbalanced'
growth of either agriculture or industry. As will be seen, Shanin
was clearly an 1 agriculture first' man.
The collection of essays by Preobrazhensky published as The Ne,-J
Economics (op. cit.) is the more well-known work of this original
writer. However, it is rewarding here to consider more fully his
'Economic Equilibrium in the System of the USSR, ' translated in
Spulber, pp. 124-173 (originally in Vestnik Kornmunisticheskoi
Akademii, No. 22, 1927, pp. 19-71). The later work is methodolog
ically more refined and also takes into account some major objec
tions by his critics to the earlier analysis.
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Footnote 11 continued:
Neither writer explicitly attacks the other - although the
major targets are clear enough - but it should be stressed that
Preobrazhensky's analysis was designed to embrace more than Shanin's
central arguments. Nevertheless, it is here quoted for the most
part only where they obviously are assaulted.
(The translations and page references - including eJctracts
from The New Economics - are given for Spulber I s edition.)
12

see

The Econonic Nature of our Commodity Shortage, " op.

11

cit., pp. 205-207.

13

"Questions of the Economic Course, n op. cit., p. 217.
Shanin appears to have inherited these distinctions from Preobra
zhensky's The New Econcoics (op.cit.),Shanin's 11 intra-industrial
accumulation 11 resembles what Preobrazhensky had termed 11 socialist
accumulation"; and :iulterior intra-industrial accumulation" is
akin to his uprimary socialist accumulation. 11
Shanin 's
somewhat convoluted nomenclature may have originated in his desire
to avoid 'fall-out' from the acrimonious polemics attending
Preobrazhensky's modification of Marx 1 s 'primary accumulation'
concept. See note 19 and Appendix A.

14Students

of post-revolutionary Cuban political economy can
find Shanin's general line of argument of particular interest. In
salient features it was to constitute the basic rationale of
Cuban development strategy from 1963, This was not known in Cuba
at that time, for the Soviet economic debate of the 1920's began
to be explored there only in 1967. It has subsequently been a
topic of keen interest. Indeed, it is virtually certain that
Cuban students of political economy are better informed about the
debate than are most of their Soviet counterparts.
1511The oreanic structure
of capital is considerably smaller
in agriculture, and labour requirements are considerably greater.
One and the same unit of capital brings into play masses of labour
eight times as great in agriculture as in industry; and with the
same rate of labour utilisation the same unit of capital yields a
much larger accumulation in agriculture than in industry. More
over, the level of consumption in agriculture is lower than in
industry and this further enhances the accumulative effect of
capital invested in a3riculture. 11 11Questions of the Economic Course,
p. 219. The greater 'fruitfulness' of investment in agriculture
in Cuba - with ~ane and animal husbandry rather than grain and
animal husbandry as p::iorities - was explained primarily in terms
of the productivity-incre~sin g potential of 'advanced' techniques
applied where traditionall'y 'primitive' technology coexisted with
considerable productive experience.

11
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16

Ibid, p. 21L~.

l? Ibid, PP• 215-216.
18

1bid, PP• 219-220.

19
The New Economics (as translated in Spulber, pp. 234-236.
Preobrazhensky had aroused considerable ire by his use (but not
invention) of the term 'primary socialist accumulation. 1 The
subject has an interesting, if somewhat tortuous, history. See
Appendix A.
2011 Economic

Equilibrium in the System of the USSR, 11 op. cit.,
p. 172.
(Dobb, in his 'Discussions of the 1920 's, 1 has credited
nukharin with the early employment of the term lidynamic economic
equilibrium" in his Notes pf an Economist of 1928 but it may more
properly belong to Preobrazhensky).

21

Preobrazhensky had referred, earlier, to "our socialist
industry, puny when it comes to capital and retarded when it
comes to technology." (The New Economics, in Spulber, p. 248).
2211

Non-equivalent exchange II was to be effected by a variety
of taxes and tariffs. Rail-transport tariffs, and credit-charges he
described as 11mighty levers 11 of econor;1ic regulation. However,
the employment of the monopoly-power of State industry in the
production of industrial consumer-goods, to be exercised via a
substantial increase in the ratio of prices at which such products
and agricultural produce exchanged was "of enormous consequence.••
for socialist accumulation. 11 (See The New Economics.)
2311

Economic Equilibrium in the System of the USSR, "

op. cit.,

P• 169.
24

since light industry required both tools of production and
agricultural raw materials, it was thus in the 11general interest
of light state industry and of peasant production of technical
crops that accumulation in heavy industry, ,Jhich must always pre
~ expanded reproduction of these branches, should be as rapid
as possible. 11 (Ibid, p. 153).
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2511

The fact that new plants will begin to turn out output
three or four years after the start of their construction is the
result of a technical rather than an economic necessity. First
a delay, then a forward jump are inevitable. To even out this
discontinuity would be possible only on the basis of larger ex
ports and foreign loans. The reason why the latter is impossible
is precisely the fact that in our country there is taking place
not merely expanded production but expanded socialist production
in industry, and world capitalism is not inclined to help it. 11
(Ibid, p. 141. )
26
27

Ibid, p. 153.
Ibid, p. 169.

23

1bid, p. 171. {Inter alia, it has been the custom to
credit Prof. J.v. Robinson with the distinction between 'open' and
'disguised' unemployment, transplanting - and modifying - the no
tion from the industrial context into which she introduced it in
1938 to peasant agriculture.)
29

1t should be emphasised that the growth-accelerating
effect beyond the short-term of the relative concentration of
investment-funds in Department I of industry is not depicted on
the time-scale drawn in the Diagram. For a remarkable growth•
model of the period of relevance to this theme see G.A. Feldman's
11
0n the Theory of Gro,;-1th Rates of National Income" I & II, of
1928-29, translated in Spulber. Also see Dobb's Soviet Economic
Development since 1917, pp. 360-361; and 11The Discussions of the
1920's about Building Socialism" pp. 165-166.
3011Questions of the Economic Course,

11

p. 214.

3111 Economic Equilibrium in
the System of the USSR, " pp. 172.. 173.
This statement - with the list of 1icontradictions" that fore•
ran it - provided a useful perspective of the costs involved in
the Soviet situation of 'Socialism in One Country'. At the same
time, it indicated - in assaciation~ith a much lower endowment of
industrial raw materials - the essential political preconditions
permitting Cuba the relative luxury of pursuing Shanin's develop..
ment path. Generally speaking, Preobrazhensky's analysis can be
viewed as providing the economic heavy artillery that supported the
political positions associated with Trotsky.
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32
The employment of this terminology in the context of Soviet
political economy is primarily associated, in the 1920's, ,~ith
v. G. Groman (see11 llOn Certain Regularities Empirically Observable
in Our Economy, Planovoe khoziaistvo, No. 1, 1925; in Spulber,
PP• 361-364) and v. Bazarov (see "On the Methodology for Draft
ing Perspective Plans, " Ibid, No. 7, 1926; in Spulber, pp. 365377).
33

Prior to 1956, Soviet historiography tended to claim ''vie•
tory" for the 'teleologists' and "defeat II for the 'geneticists'.
Equally erroneously, sooe writers have claimed that variation in
the time-horizon of the plan achieved a complete synthesis be
tween the two "schools. 11 (For a recent sketch of the debate cast
in the latter terms, see J. Goldmann 's ' 1Karl Marx, the Soviet
Economists of the Twenties and Contemporary 'Konjunkturforschung'
in a Socialist Country" in Czechoslovak Economic Papers No. 11,
Academia Publishing House, Prague, 1969.)
34

strumilin made the important point that the extension of
the time-horizon of the plan multiplied the choice of targets open
to the planner, although he conceded 'genetic' constraints to be
dominant both in a plan of short-term conception and in the initial
period of a long-term plan. As Dobb e:1{pressed the argument: "To
each time-horizon of given radius there corresponds its given
range of possibilities; the existing pattern of productive re
sources and its degree of tractability being the determinants of
this range. As the radius of the time-horizon extends, the range
of possibilities increases - the number of alternative routes
rises by which, when the day arrives, that horizon can be crossed. 11
(Soviet Economic Development since 1917, op.cit., p. 7). This
major modification of the 'geneticist' case can be seen to be
largely 'technical' in character: it did not deal directly with
constraints identified by the 'geneticists' to originate in the
social relations rather than the forces of production.
35

see Dobb, 'The Discussions of the 1920 's about Building
Socialism, ' op. cit., pp, 161-163. Some conflicts between 'geneticists'
and 'teleologists' are commonly spoken of as between 'pessimists'
and 'optimists, ' or 'determinists' and 'voluntarists. ' Further,
explanations of policies emerging from such conflicts are sometimes
couched in class terms. For example, Charles Bettleheim speaks of
certain post-revolutionary policies in Cuba as "related to political
domination by a 'radicalized' section of the petty bourgeoisie."
(See 'The Transition between Socialism and Capitalism' in The Monthly
Review Vol. 20, March 1969, New York, p. 8). Sweezy (Ibid, p. 18)
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Footnote 35 continued: rightly observes that: "This is a formula,
not an explanation" and is thus not helpful. In fact, it is not
merely an unhelpful view but an obscurantist one, not least be
cause such policies commonly change with no corresponding change
in the class composition of the political leadership, and also
because such formulas are so often deployed pejoratively by mem
bers of the 'radicalized' petty bourgeoisie,
36 11

0n the Methodology for Drafting Perspective Plans, 11 op. cit.,
(pp. 365-366 in Spulber). Bazarov could here have drawn on Lenin's
own practical expression of the implications of this point. He
had, in 1921, identified food supplies as the basic factor upon
which a general economic plan for the period was to be built. He
recommended, accordingly, that three variants of the plan be pre
pared, the practical implementation of one of them to be determined
by whether food supp lies turned out to be below, equal to, or
above the current estimate. (See Dobb, Soviet Economic Development
since 1917, pp. 3l:.l-342. )
37 Quoted in Dobb, p. 352. A. Gerschenkron has described
salient features of the 'unapproachable fortress' of which Bazarov
spoke: 11.,.the peasant economy can reduce the extent of its con
nections with outside markets by diverting cereals into converted
products for its own consumption, and by assigning a larger
portion of the land to fibrous crops for home spinning and weaving.
For the Russian peasantry with its weak marketing tradition the es
cape into greater self-sufficiency suggested itself as an easy
and natural response to the economic conditions which prevailed
in the second half of the 1920's. 11 (See 'Russia: Patterns and
Problems of Economic Development, 1361~1958' in Economic Backward
ness in Historical Perspective, Harvard, 1962, p. 144,) The nature
of the 1 fortress 1 similarly suggests the limitations both of
Preobrazhensky's fiscal 'mighty levers' and of the power imputed
by him to the State's ability to control the prices of industrial
consumer-goods. (See note 22 above.)
38
N,P. Oganovsky, in 1927, quoted by Dobb, Ibid, p. 233.
39 Kontrolnie Tsifri na 1926-7, g. 9; quoted by Dobb, Ibid,
p. 346.

40

Quoted by Dobb, Ibid, p. 353.

41110

. ' 11 y Ob serva bl e i n our
Empirica
· '
1 ar1.t1es
n .
· h.egu
n Certain
Economy, in Spulber, p. 361.
11
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42

Published in Leninism by J,V. Stalin (English Edition:
Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1940, pp. 205-216).
43
44

Leninism, pp. 206-7.
Ibid, p. 207.

45A considerable controversy concerning the accuracy of
Nemchinov's data has been partially fueled by the fact that the
memorandum accompanying it was not published by Stalin.
On the one hand, stress has been placed (notably by M.Lewin)
on the difficulties inherent in classifying the peasantry in neat
class-divisions. (See, for example, Lewin 's 'Hho was the Soviet
Kulak?' in Soviet Studies No. 2, Oct. 1966, especially pp. 189206.)
The other major arena of debate has concerned the statistics
of 'marketed' grain. J,F. Karcz has argued that Nemchinov's 1913
figures of 'marketed 3rain' in fact portrayed 'gross' marketings
(i.e. included local village scales) and that the 1926/27 figures
represent only 'net' marketings (i.e. extra-village sales). (See
'Thoughts on the Grain Problem' in Soviet Studies No, 4, April 1967.)
R. w. Davies has examined this suggestion and rejects it convincingly.
(See 'A Note on Grain Statistics' in Soviet Studies No. 3, 1970.)
After assessing the available data for the two periods he finds that:
''Any conclusions about the 1926/27: prewar 1 gross marketings' ratio
must in the present state of our knowledge be extremely tentative. ;i
(Ibid, p. 323.) He stresses that "the total figure for marketed
grain depended on an intricate balancing of different types of in
formation of varying reliability, 11 the "estimates of peasant purchases•••
and of sales on the private market••. (being) ..• particularly hazardous. 11
(P. 317.) However, the data for 'net marketings' - which was Stalin's
prime concern - seems sufficiently strong for Davies to assert that:
"'Net marketings' of grain in 1926/27 were between 50. 0% and 56. 9%
of the prewar level, amounting to 9. 7-10. 4- million tons against 18.119. 3 million tons. 11 (P. 328.) In E. H. Carr's view, the "multiplication
of the number, and the reduction of size, of the units of production
makes it certain that a substantially lower proportion of the grain
harvest was brought to the market. But the statistical material
available does not justify any precise estimate of the extent of
the decline. 11 (See Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929, Vol. 1,
MacMillan, London, 1969, p. 91D, )
46

Ibid, P• 205.
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47

See

Dobb, Ibid, pp. 211-212.

MlE. H, Carr in nRevolution from Above: Some Notes on the
Decision to Collectivize Soviet Agriculture, li in The Critical
Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse, Boston, 1967, p. 319.
(Reprinted in 1917: Before and After, MacMillan, London, 1969,
pp, 95-109.)

49

D, Mitrany, commentin3 in 1951 on the effects of agrarian
reform in Eastern Europe as a v;,hole after 1917, observed that:
''What distinguished the eastern peasant from the western large
farmer or peasant farmer, was that to him his land was first and
foremost a means of raising food for his family and his animals •.•
A freer use of their crops or even a larger yield meant first of
all a higher consumption among the peasants themselves, who form
erly had gone short of food or had been living on poor food."
(Marx Against the Peasantc London, 1951, p. 118.)

50
1eninism, pp. 207-209.
51

Dobb, 'The Discussions of the 1920 1 s about Building Social
ism, ' p. 157. It is possible that the conversion of wage-labourers
into peasants and of sub-sis·t.ence farmers into self-sufficient
farmers encroached upon the sources of pre-revolutionary labour particularly harvest labour - available to the kulaks in some areas.
52

M. Lewin thus criticises the 11Right-wing position" but as
we have seen, the cap also fitted 'Leftists' such as Preobrazhensky.
(See "The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization" in Soviet
Studies, Oct. 1965, No, ~ p. 178.)

53

E. H- Carr, in 11Reflections on Soviet Industrialisation,
1917: Before and After, op. cit., p. 121.

11

in

54
Total agricultural production between 1926-28 is estimated
to have increased at an annual rate of 2. 5%, (Carr, "Revolution from
Above, " op. cit., p. 317.) Oganovsky and Weinstein offered (con
servative) estimates of a 2% per annum increase in agricultural
yields per acre for the period following 1927 /28. (Dobb, Soviet
Economic Development since 1917, p. 212.)
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55
See Table 1. Stalin was to invest the 0.2% increase over
landlord farming given by Nemchinov with sufficient precision to
permit him to use the word "larger" in its context. See Leninism,
p, 207.

56

Ibid, pp. 210-212. Later in the year Stalin was to restate
these three propositions succinctly in his speech on 'Industrial
ization of the Country and the Right Deviation, 1 (See Spulber, p.
273.)

57

Ibid, p. 213. In concrete terms, Stalin mentioned such
grain-supplies to be from 32-l~0% greater than those he reported
for 1926-27.
58

There is evidence to suggest that Stalin's appreciation of
the problem was not shared at the time by the majority of the
political leaders of the Party. The growing crisis in grain supplies
and the measures adopted to deal with it in the spring of 1929
(seep. 23) appear to have had been decisive in swaying the majority
towards Stalin's vie'\'JS, See Appendb~ B,
5911 1n encouraging associations of every kind, and also agri
cultural communes, of middle peasants, the representatives of
Soviet power should not permit the slightest compulsion in found
ing such bodies •.• Those representatives of the Soviet power who
allow themselves to apply not merely direct, but even indirect,
compulsion in order to attach peasants to communes, should be
held strictly accountable and removed from work in the countryside."
(Lenin's draft to the 8th Party Congress of 1919, cited by Carr,
"Revolution from Above, 11 p. 314.) Molotov (quoted by Carr, Ibid,
p. 315) was to state in 1927: "The affair can proceed only by way
of the gradual development of large collective farms •.. We can permit
of no illusions, no coercion in regard to the peasantry in the
transition to large-scale farming,"
Stalin himself, one month after his 11 Grain Front" speech was
to publish in Pravda a quotation from the 8th Party Congress (1919)
resolution on "The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry": "To confuse
the middle peasants with the kulaks, to extend to them, to any
degree, the measures that are directed against the kulaks, means to
grossly violate, not only all the decrees of the Soviet government
and its whole policy, but also all the fundamental principles of
Communism. 11 ("Lenin and the Question of f,lliance with the Middle
Peasant, " in Leninism, op. cit., p. 224. )

~
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60
This writer does not ascribe any decisive importance, in
sofar as concerns Government motivation at the time, to the purely
ideological 'advances' implicit to this conception. See Appendix

B.
61

E.H. Carr has noted that the general sense of urgency on
this subject from 1927 was heightened by "the international crisis
and the war scare of the spring and summer of 1927 (disaster in
China, breaking-off of relations by Great Britain), which focused
attention on the need for rapid industrialisation and for emphasis
on the heavy capital industries which were the basis of military
strength. 11 ("Revolution from Above, 11 pp. 316-317.)
62

Dobb, "The Discussions of the 1920's about Building Socialism,
P• 158.
63

Magnitudes cited by Dobb9 Soviet Economic Development since
1917, p. 234.
64

1ntro d uction
·
h First
·
·
. Pl an o f t h e Uss~K,
tote
Five-Year
Economic
1929; translated in Spulber, op.cit., pp. 476-477.
GS Carr,

Ibid, p. 322.

66

Directed essentially against the wealthier peasants with
hoarded grain, the measures were in practice to encourage them to
cut back the area sown to this crop. (See Carr, Ibid, p. 321. )
67

And thus the abandonment of key tenets of the 'Worker-Peasant
Alliance' within the politico-economic parameters of which the
discussion had been conducted.
68

Given Stalin's identification of the middle, rather than the
kulak, peasant as the 'central figure' in agriculture there is no
reason to suppose this to have been unintentional. The limited
scale of collectivization prior to 1928-29 (despite its ideological
attractions for the Soviet Government from its earliest days) re
flected both peasant indifference tothis mode of production and its
relative neglect as regards the allocation of investment funds.

11
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69

stalin, having personally initiated the removal of clauses
emphasising the voluntary principle in 1929 (see Dobb, Soviet
Economic Development since 1917, p. 2li-7, note 2) disassociated
himself from coercive measures against non-kulak peasants in March
1930. (See his 11Dizzy with Success, 11 Pravda, March, 1930, in
Leninism, op. cit., pp. 333-338.) Following this re-assertion of the
voluntary principle, collective farm membership fell from 14 million
peasant households to 5 million by May, 1930. (Dobb, Ibid, p. 248.)
This outflow of peasant households was not spatially uniform. In
the most important grain-surplus regions of the southern steppes,
the outflow of peasants uas smaller than else~vhere. This has been
attributed in part to an unusually clear differentiation of agrarian
classes in these areas: the average size of farms was relatively
large as was the proportion of landless labourers and semi-proletar
ians working for their owners. Following Stalin's 'Grain Front'
speech, the process of collectivizatio n in these regions advanced
considerably before the drestic drive in the winter of 1929-30. ·
(See v.P. Timosh;;;Tco•s Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem,
Food Research Institute:--· St~nford~--19.'.fa; pp~ 103-5, 118 and 245.)
70

such incentives included rights to private plots of land, sales
to local markets, etc.
71

By the end of 1931, 16, 000 tractors and 5, 000 combine-harves ters
(many imported from the u.s.A. and Germany) were reported for the
State farm sector. ny the end of 1932, though occupying only 10%
of the national sown area, such farms held more than half of all the
(Dobb, Ibid, p. 250.)
nation!:; tractors.
72

The stock of horned cattle fell from 60.1 million in 1928 to
33. 5 million in 1933, the proportion of cm·JS in the respective totals
rising from 49% in 1928 to 58% in 1933. (Official Soviet statistics
cited by Mandel in his Marxist Economic Theory, Vol. 2, English
Edition by Merlin Press, London, 1968, p. 554.) The number of
horses over the same period fell by about one-quarter according to
Dobb (Ibid, p. 246.)
73

Speech to the 17th Party Congress, 1934, quoted by Dobb, Ibid,
(Stalin was to observe: "If we compare the enormous sums
P• 251.
the State has invested in them with the actual results they have
achieved to date, we shall find an enormous balance against the State
farms. 11 )
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74The livestock slaughter sharply reduced the value of total
agricultural output. National grain-yields were lower for the
period 1929-32 than for 1925-28. Widespread famine in predominantly
rural areas has been extensively reported for the period 1932-34.
75 carr, "Revolution from Above,

11

p. 313.

76 nobb, Ibid, p. 249.
77 Figures cited by A. Baykov in Development of the Soviet
Economic System, Cambridge University Press, 1946 (reprinted 1970),
pp. 325-326. Dr. Baykov also reported deliveries by collective
farms to the State to average 32% of gross yields in 1931 and 1932,
falling to 20. 5% in 1933 and 1934. (Ibid, p. 203.)
78 see note 57.

Also See Appendix B,

79nobb, Ibid, pp. 360-361.
80
Whether such casualties were to be permanent or temporary for example, Preobrazhensky and Strumilin respectively - naturally
depended on whether bullets did or did not accompany political
criticism.

81
The New Economics, Clarendon Press, 1965.

APPENDIX A
On 'Original' and 'Primary Socialist' Accumulation:

In his Introduction to Book II of The Wealth of Nations,
Adam Smith had spoken of the accumulation of stock 'previous' to
a more advanced division of labour as the latte1· 1 s precondition.
Marx objected to contemporary explanations of how this 'previous'
accumulation had come into being.

He suggested that for the

'vulgar' political economists of his time it played about the same
part in political economy as did original sin in theology: "In
times long by,

i:

he wrote,

11

there were t,Jo sorts of people: one,

the diligent, intelligent, and above all, frugal elite; the othe4
lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living••• Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth•.• ''
Marx attacked this notion (and it is important to appreciate that
his alternative vision ,Jas a counter-attack on a prevailing orthodox rather than a detailed portrayal of an alternative model) and
argued that the essence of Smith's 'previous' accumulation was act
ually "the historical process of divorcing the producer from the
means of production,

11

commonly by force.

The

11

epoch-making 11 mo-

ments in the history of the pre-capitalist accumulation process
were those when "great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn
from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and 'unattached'
proletarians on the labour-market.

11

In the development of capitalist

economy, Marx suggested that the "expropriation of the agricultural
producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole
process. "(l)
Marx translated uhat had begun as Smith's 'previous' accumulation as 'ursprUngliche Akkumulation.'

This is best rendered in

English as 'original' or 'primary' accumulation but in the standard
Moore-Aveling English edition of Capital it became 'primitive, ' and
few writing in English on the subject - Gerschenkron and Sweezy
are two such - employ the better translations. (Z)

The Spanish trans

lation, on the other hand, is 'originaria, ' and the Russian
'pervonachal'nyi' is equivalent to 'primary.'

Both the Russian and

the Spanish translations lack the connotations present in 'primitive'
of something rough, uncivilised, or even barbarous.
As we have seen, for Marx 'original' or 'primary I accumulation
did not simply consist of the process of transferring surplus pro
duce from pre-capitalist to emerging capitalist economic formations.
It consisted also of the entire process of changing the social

(l)Capital, Vol. 1, Part VIII, Ch.xxvi. The liberty has here
been taken of altering the punctuation slightly from that given in
the Moore-Aveling translation.
(Z)Roy's French edition of Capital preceded the English trans
lation and translated 1 ursprUngliche' as 'primitif. 1 It is possible
that this influenced the subsequent English rendering of 'primitive'
but the French possesses the 'crudity' connotations to a lesser de
gree.
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relations of production,

Preobrazhensky, in interpreting the

nature of post-revolutionary Soviet development, modified Marx's
conception.

He distinguished between 'socialist' accumulation

and 'primary' socialist accumulation.

The former was accumulation

within socialist industry on the basis of surplus produce gener
ated within that industry itself; and the latter was accumulation
within socialist industry on the basis of surplus produce, extract
ed via fiscal and monetary mechanisms, from the private sector and
3
principally from peasant agriculture. ( )

This notion embraced as

pects of Marx's conception, namely tl.-:e transfer of material re
sources from a

1

prirnary 1

-

pre-capitalist - mode of production

(peasant economy) to an historically more 'advanced' mode of pro
duction (socialist industry).

However, absent from the concept of

'primary socialist accumulation' in Preobrazhensky's writings was
the expropriation of the peasantry itself.

As we have seen, this,

and an associated use of coercion, was the central theme of Marx's
writings on 'original' or 'primary' accumulation and this largely
explained the furore thataccompanied Preobrazhensky's deployment of
the concept of 'primary socialist' accumulation.

Given the enor

mous political importance of Lenin's 'Worker-Peasant Alliance' even
such indirect connotations of expropriation and force were deemed to
be more than_ unfortunate.

_______ __

,
(3)See The New Econorr:ics.
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The process of forced collectivization in Soviet agriculture
encouraged a resurrection of both Marx 1 s and Preobrazhensky 's terms
to describe subsequent socialist economic development.

Isaac

Deutscher, for example, was accustomed to describe both the 1930 1 s
and the post-19li-5 phase of Soviet economic development as periods
4
of 'primitive accumulation. ,( ) More recently, K.S. Karol has cat
egorised contemporary Cuban economic development as 'primitive
socialist accumulation. ,(S)
basement as concepts.

Both usages seem to involve their de

It is arguable that the Soviet collectiviza

tion period can be described as one of 'original' or 'primary'
accumulation.

Perhaps preferable would be 'primary socialist ac

cumulation' if one incorporated into Preobrazhensky's conception
Marx's emphasis on the changing of social relations of production
in agriculture and of the role of coercion in that process.

(Thus

some distinction would be drawn between capitalist and socialist
economic formations.)

Whether or not this would be illuminating,

the post-1945 period of Soviet reconstruction and further growth
corresponds neither to Marx's nor Preobrazhensky's conception of
'ursprUngliche' and 'primary socialist' accumulation, and it would
appear that Deutscher's 'primitive accumulation' means in this con-

4
( )As in his biography of Stalin, Oxford University Press, 2nd
Edition, 1967.
(S)See The Guerrillas in Power, Hill and Wang, New York, 1970.
Karol originally wrote in French. See note (2).
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text little more than a high rate of investment with tightly re
stricted consumption.

It is obvious that for Karol, Cuba's

'primitive socialist accumulation' means no more than this.

Con

temporary Cuban development i s ~ principally characterised by
the accumulation of material resources in the hands of the state
from sources lying outside the complex of the state economy,
primarily from peasant agriculture, and Karol's use of the concept
bears no relations to Preobrazhensky's formulation.

Alexander

Gerschenkron once censured Soviet Marxists for using Marx's ideas
on the process of 'original accumulation 1 "as symbols in a ritual
istic cerem_ony rather than as tools in an independent analysis. ,,( 6 )

As can be seen, both Marx and Preobrazhensky require protection
from less 'orthodox' Marxists too.
It is difficult not to conclude that an important element in
the abuse of Marx's or Preobrazhensky's concepts may lie precisely

in the rough, uncivilised or barbarous connotations either of the
word 'primitive' or of the Soviet collectivation process.

This is

a fairly potent reason for insisting on the use of the more accurate
terms 'original' or 'primary' despite their relative unfamiliarity.

6
( )see 'Rosario Romeo and Original Accumulation' in Economic

Backwardness in Historical Perspective, op.cit., p. 97.
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APPENDIX

B

Some Comparative Notes on Soviet Collectivization:

To understate the matter, the nature, causes and consequences
of the collectivization process are a matter of controversy.
In some treatments, the drastic drive of the winter of 192930 emerges as an illogical, if not quite mad act explicable prim
arily in terms of 'ideology.'

The focussing of attention on

trends in the volume or value of total agricultural production
rather than on marketed supplies over the period 1929-32 lends
plausibility to this view.
Another, and rather more sophisticated version portrays events
in terms of a 'leap in the dark.;

The grain supplies crisis is

recognised but its resolution via collectivization is seen as large
ly fortuitous.

In this story, Stalin is commonly portrayed as a

ditherer who did not really know where he was going.
As is clear from the emphasis placed in this text on certain
selected themes, neither of these views is here accepted.

It is

argued that by May 1928, Stalin had accurately identified the
principal causes of the decline in extra-rural grain marketings and
had seen collectivisation and the expansion of state farms as
crucial to their restoration to, if not increase above, pre-1914
levels.

He had also then identified the 'middle' peasant, not the
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kulak, as the 'central figure' in agriculture.

Then, as later in

the same year, his preoccupation with grain surpluses rather than
with total agricultural production or even total grain production
is quite clear.

It is not this writer's opinion that Stalin sub

sequently forgot this analysis or substantially altered his rank
ing of priorities.

The Soviet political leadership of 1928 does

not appear, however, to have been in Stalin's pocket.

It took the

grain supplies crisis of 1928-29 - with its associated "War Com
munism" solutions - to win the majority to Stalin's view and to
accelerate the collectivization process itself.
That the subsequent collectivization process was itself vastly
confused is beyond dispute.

However, it seems inaccurate in this

writer's opinion to argue that the confusion of the process mirrored
some comparable confusion of Stalin's purpose.
Rather implausibly, perhaps, comparison and contrast with
Cuba's Second Agrarian Reform of October 1963 illuminates certain
of the more crucial factors contributing to the essential messiness
of Soviet collectivization.
The Cuban reform, like Soviet collectivization, was intimately
related to the ne,v economic development strategy enunciated in the
same year.

It lowered the ceiling on private land-holdings from

just over 400 hectares to 67.1 hectares, expanding the State sector
from about 40% to near to 70% of the total farm area.

When ex-
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propriated, such farms were reckoned to embrace more than one-fifth
of the national cultivable area, including more than one-quarter of
the area then sown to cane.

Their share of the national cattle

herd and of quality pasture-lands was reckoned to be 'decisive. '(l)
Furthermore, such farms had traditionally supplied a significant
proportion of nationally produced foodstuffs to the towns and their
importance in this respect had been especially great in the pro
vince of Havana.

<2>

For a complex of reasons, from 1961 the market

ed surpluses of such farms had on average been declining sharply
in almost all branches of production.

The relationship between

their expropriation and the new growth strategy, in which the
expansion of cane cultivation and of meat and dairy farming were
assigned key roles, ·was a singl:llatly

3

obvious one. ( )

Nonetheless,

(l)See Carlos Rafael Rodriguez' 'El Nuevo Camino de la Agricul
tura Cubana' in Cuba Socialista No. 27, Nov. 1963, Havana; pp. 73-4.
(Z)See Memoria del Censo Agricola Nacional de 1946 of the Cuban
Ministry of Agriculture, Fernandez y Cia, Havana, 1951; Tables 12 and 47.
3
( ) 11The crucial obs tac le to any attempt to impose a set of central

ised decisions upon a capitalist econo~y is the tendency of entre
preneurs, who still hold (or until recently held) rights of economic
sovereignty, to obstruct any provisions' of an economic plan which
run counter to the aim of maximising profit to be earned upon their prop
erty. Quite apart from anything of a sufficiently political and con
scious character to justify the name of 'economic sabotage, ' a concerted
passive resistance would probably develop from the play of conditioned
entrepreneur-behaviour alone. In such circumstances an economic plan
imposed upon the economy from above is likely to have a purely negative
character, excluding certain courses of action from the agenda or
setting limits within -which the autonomous decisions of entrepreneur
units can operate. 11 H. H. Dobb, Soviet Economic Development since 1917,
op. cit., p. 30.

- 51 -

if the purpose of the reform were to be interpreted by reference
to the tone and emphases of most official edicts and speeches of
the time, the conclusion (as with Soviet collectivization) could
have been that 'ideology' had been the dominant motivation.

This

is not to say that there was no validity in the charges of
'counter-revolutionary activity' imputed to the 'bourgeois' owners of
such farms.

(These included fomenting, or aiding and abetting

armed counter-revolution in the countryside and politically sub
orning peasants and wa8e-workers.)

It is to say, however, that

neither the purpose nor function of the reform would have been

adequately comprehended were too much weight to be ascribed to
such factors.
More illuminating were the contrasting modes of implementation
of Cuba's Second Agrarian Reforra and Soviet collectivization.

In

contrast to the Soviets' 'frontal attack' on the kulaks, the Cuban
States capture of the economic base of the most important surviving
segment of the rural 'capitalist' class was swift, efficient and
virtually bloodless.
At dawn on October 3rd 1963,

'interveners' of the Institute of

Agrarian Reform (INRA), accompanied by members of the Rebel Army,
simultaneously occupied all privately-owned farms larger than 67. 1
hectares.

This operation was obviously facilitated by the relatively

small size of the country - with relatively good communications
systems within it - and by the fact that the farms to be occupied
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numbered thousands , not millions. ( 4 )

The number of military and

administr ative personnel required to implement the Reform was thus
relativel y small and it was comparati vely easy to deploy them for
simultane ous action.

At least as important was the extreme simplicit y of the
criterion employed for expropria tion.

As a guide to the 'class

enemy' in the countrysi de, the quantity of land held was very rough
and ready, particula rly at the margin.

No allowance was made for

variation s in soil-fert ility or other natural or unnatural advan
tages which farmers might or might not enjoy.

In consequen ce, just

as some relativel y 'rich, ' predomin antly 'capitali st' farmers es
caped the Reform, so some 'middle' peasants were expropria ted.

At

the time these disadvant ages seem to have been appreciat ed but
were outweighe d by the fact that the size of the vast majority of
farms was actually known whereas the other variables , pertinent
though they might be, ·were not.

Knowledge of the size of farms

permitted the central framing of concise and unambiguous directive s
for the army of cadres that was to implement the Reform and the
latter was thus required to exercise no great political or other
initiativ e at a local level.
The essential ly peaceful character of the intervent ion was

4
( )The number of farms expropria ted was estimated at about 10
thousand.
(See c. Rafael Rodriguez , Ibid, p. 98. )
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partly a product of its swiftness,

for just as it gave no oppor

tunity for the slaughter of livestock, etc.,

it gave none for the

organization of resistance even had it been contemplated.

Further,

since as acts of class-,,ar go the Reform was relatively humane both
in conception and implementation (S),

it provoked but slight popular

sympathy for its victims even in areas in which their personal
influence had been strong.
While the ravages of Cyclo::1.e 'Flora' (which struck Cuba a
matter of days after the implementation of the Reform) complicate
an already difficult task of assessing and accounting for trends
in agricultural production for the period, it is not disputed that
the total value of agricultural production for 196l~ was higher
than that of 1963, and that of 1965 was higher than that of 1964.
And in 1964, data was published comparing State purchases of a
variety of privately produced agricultural produce over the first
quarters of the years 1963 and 1964.

The decline in deliveries of

certain crops was far smaller than might have been supposed given

(S)Where farms greater than 67. 1 hectares were found to have
been operated by adult relatives whose individual shares did not
exceed the statutory limit, they were more or less swiftly returned.
In a few exceptional cases, farmers operating farms above the limit
were allowed to retain them. Some compensation at a flat per
hectare rate, payable over ten years, was made to expropriated
landowners. Those possessing urban as ivell as farm houses were re
quired to move to the towns. Those without them were able to re
main.
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the substanti al reduction in the size of the Private sector be
tween the two periods.

Deliverie s of several products in fact

increased . ( 6 )
The contrast between much of this and the Soviet collectiv ization process could scarcely be more striking and was in most
instances to be explained precisely by the absence in Soviet
Russia of certain 'objectiv e' condition s identifie d above in
the Cuban experienc e.
The kind of lightning 'pre-empt ive strike' that the Cuban
State successfu lly launched against its 'rural bourgeoi sie' on
3 October 1963 was quite impossibl e to realise against the kulak
of rural Russia.

This was not solely for reasons of sheer geo

graphic mass or poor communic ations.
that the collectiv ization

1

More crucial was the fact

cadres 1 that the Soviet State could

amass were equal to their prodigiou s task in neither number nor
quality.

It was well-know n that "Party membershi p in the country-

( 6}see ti.. Regalado, 'Las Funciones de la ANAP, ' in Cuba
Socialist a No. 35, Havana, July 1964, p. 19. This tended, on the
one hand, to support assertion s that the marketed supplies of farms
expropria ted under the Second Agrarian Reform had declined very
greatly by 1963. It suggests also that while farmers unaffecte d
by the Reform may generally have given credence to emphatic official
statement s of its 'definitiv e' and 'final' character , some of them
may also have taken out a little I insurance ' against any future
selective expropria tion by increasin g their sales to State purchas
ing agencies.
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side was chronically weak, both in number and quality. ,.(7) Re
flecting this, during the winter of 1929-30 some 25,000 industrial workers - mostly communists - were despatched to the country
side to promote collectivizatio n. (S)

That the proselytising powers

of urban enthusiasts were less than overwhelming among the peasants
had long been recognised. ( 9 )

Fu:rther, a woefully weak

I

cadre force 1

was obliged to mobilize its rural revolutionary 'allies' for class
struggle where classes themselves had become increasingly diffi
cult to differentiate with clarity.
might be batraks

and

1

On paper in Moscow there

poor 1 peasants clearly distinguishable from

'middle' peasants; and 'middle' peasants in turn might be clearly
distinguishable from 'rich' ones or kulaks.

In the villages, even

had Stalin intended that for operational purposes all such fine
distinctions be observed, it was no easy matter to make them.

In

Cuba, by contrast, no mobilization of 'allies'• with all the pro
found implications of spontaneity and uncertainty associated with
such a process - was required to implement the Second Agrarian

<7>E. H.

Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929,
Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 143.
(S)V. P. Timoshenko, Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem,
op. cit., p. 122.
9
( )For Lenin's tart remarks on this subject, see 'Report on
Work in the Rural Districts' of March 1919 in Selected Works, Vol.
8, op.cit., p. 179.
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Reform.

The centrally organised 'cadre force' was more than

sufficient for the task and operationally, identification of
the 'enemy' could be reduced in essence to: "Those with less
than five caballerias of land are with us; those with more are
And who had more and who had less was in most

against us."

cases already known.
Underlying all these factors was the contrasting nature
artd recent history of the agrarian class-structure itself.

In

Cuba prior to 1959 there had been a 'latifundist' class roughly
corresponding to the landlords of Russia's prerevolutionary
'estates.'

However, Cuba's First Agrarian Reform, largely im

plemented in the second half of 1960, had for the most part
retained the large-scale landholdings of this class in large
scale units under State control.

By contrast, with the Soviet

agrarian reform of 1917, the large-scale estates were mostly
devoured by batraks and 'poor' and 'middle' peasants (IO) who
in the years of Civil War also substantially depleted the holdings
of the kulaks.

In Cuba, then, comparatively few wage-labourers

(lO)Bolshevik acquiescence at the time corresponded neither
to political nor economic long-range aspirations but stemmed
from the short-term political and military imperative to secure
the rural masses as allies. The Bolsheviks had always believed
that rapid increases in the productivity of both land and labour
could be guaranteed only within a large-scale mode of agricultural
production. They did not doubt that the agrarian reform that they
had perforced sponsored was not Marxian revolution but, rather, a
popular historical regression.
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became small-scale peasant farmers and comparatively few small
scale farmers increased their holdings at the expense of larger
scale farmers or landlords.

In short, the agricultural pro

letariat and semi-proletariat - in any event far larger and more
clearly delineated proportionately than its pre-1917 Russian
counterpart - remained substantially intact.

The Second Agrarian

Reform did not thus enmesh an agrarian class well-laced with
farmers who had until but recently been wage-workers or 'poor'
peasants.

The Cuban State in 1963 thus avoided the vast Soviet

trauma of endeavouring to assume effective control over land
which the peasantry (or at least a substantial section of it)
had in the fairly recent past wrested from their old masters or
'betters. 1 (ll)
As is often the case, to establish the exception is to
suggest the rule.

In pre-revolutionary Russia as a whole a

trend towards increasing class-polarization had been marked.

In

general, however, this process was not as advanced as in pre
revolutionary Cuba but there was one major exception in which
there were some striking congruities.

(ll)As Lenin observed in 1919: 11When we took over power we
relied on the support of the peasantry as a whole. At that time
the aim of all the peasants was identical - to fight the landlords.
But their prejudice against large-scale farming has remained to
this day. The peasant thinks: 'A large farm, that means I shall
again be an agricultural labourer. 111 ('Report on Work in the Rural
Districts,' op.cit. p. 179.) It became clear a decade later that
this sentiment had not disappeared.

/

- 58 -

In the southern and south-eastern steppes of Russia, pop
ulation density had been relatively low and the average size of
farms both before and after the agrarian reform of 1917 was rel
atively large.

Generally speaking it was an area of specialised

grain-farming and it provided major surpluses both for export
via the southern ports and for urban consumption to the north.
The owners of the pre-revolutionary estates planted grain, as
did the peasants, but a higher proportion of their 1,md was not
cropped, being commonly used for the extensive grazing of cattle.
The combination of a relatively low population density, a rel

atively large average farm-size and a relatively high degree of
crop-specialisation ensured that local labour supplies were in
sufficient to meet the peak (principally harvesting) needs of
both estates and larger peasant farms.

The seasonal shortage of

labour was met by a massive annual influx of migrant workers
from the north who commonly earned daily wage-rates about 50
per cent higher than those prevailing for comparable tasks in
the northern black-soil areas. (l 2 )

(12)F or all this, see V. P. Timoshenko,
op.cit., pp. 200 and
241-2.
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In essential features - given the substitution of 'cane'
for

1

grain 1

-

the steppe regions thus described had much in

common with major areas of Cuban agriculture prior to 1959,
the resemblance being most conspicuous for the province of
Camagiley.

It was no coincidence that just as the Cuban ex

propriation of latifundia and large-scale 'capitalist' farms
over the period 1959-63 met with the firmest 'support from
below' in the regions of greatest class-differentiation, (lJ)
so the greatest voluntary progress in collectivisation was made
in Russia's steppes.

It was there that the proportion of

peasant households without land, or with land but without work.
stock or agricultural implements, was unusually high both befcr e
and after the agrarian reform of 1917.

Collectivization pro

ceeded most swiftly there prior to the coercive drive of 192930.

And it was also in these regions that, with the restoration

of the voluntary principle in March 1930, the outflow of peasant-

{"13)In most treatments of Cuba's First and Second Agrarian
Reforms, no 'pressure from below' is reported. In fact, it was
considerable, especially in the relatively brief period between
the formal enactment of the First Agrarian Reform Law in May
1959 and its substantial implementation in the second half of
1960. (See, for example, Dr. Felipe Pazos in El Trimestre
Economico, Bo. 113, Mexico 1962, pp. 8-9). Even after the ex
propriation of the 'rural bourgeoisie' in October 1963, murmers
could still be heard for a 1 Third 1 reform what would eliminate
surviving 'rich' or even 'middle' peasants who had survived the
Second.
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households from the collectives was far smaller than elsewhere. (14)

14

<

) "In the Moscow Industrial Region the percentage of
peasant households in collectives on May 1, 1930, was 6.6 per
cent, as against 73 per cent on March 1. In the Central Black
soil Region, which was a grain-surplus region, the figure
dropped to 15 .1 per cent as against 87 per cent on March 1. 11
These figures could be contrasted with the steppe areas of
the North Caucasus and of the Ukraine where the percentage of
households in collectives in May 1930 was 55.2 and 45.4 respec
tively. (See V. P. Timoshenko, op.cit., pp. 117-18.) Timoshenko
rightly stresses that the prevalence of a system of undiversified
grain-farming, with animal husbandry being of secondary impor
tance, greatly facilitated collectivizatio n in the steppes. ( '¼11
experiments with collective farming in Soviet Russia have shown
that animal husbandry is the most difficult ••• to collectivize and
is the least successful under collectivizatio n. 11 Ibid, p. 105.)
However, an extensive, undiversified farming system is commonly a
reflection of a highly differentiated agrarian class-structure
and in such cases its specific :technical' characteristics are
best not treated as independent variables.

